Digital extortion has become a major cyber risk for many organizations; small-medium enterprises (SME) to large enterprises business and individual entrepreneurs. Ransomware is a kind of malware that is the main threat to digital extortion and has caused many organizations to lose huge revenue by paying much bigger ransom demands to the cybercriminals in recent years. The explosive growth of ransomware is due to the existing large infection vector such as social engineering, email attachment, zip file download, browsing malicious site, infected search engine which are boosted dramatically by easily available cryptographic tools, Ransomware As a Service (RaaS), increased cloud storage and off-the-self ransomware toolkits. The large infection vector and available toolkits not only grew ransomware extremely, but also made them more obfuscated, encrypted and varying patterns in the new variants. This, in turn, caused the conventional supervised analysis and detection engine to fail to detect the new variants of ransomware. This paper addresses the limitations of conventional supervised detection engine and proposes semi-supervised framework to compute the inherent latent sources of the varying patterns in the new variants in an unsupervised way using deep learning approaches. The proposed framework extracts the inherent characteristics in the varying patterns from the unlabelled ransomware obtained from the wild which is scalable to accommodate upcoming malicious executables. Then the unsupervised learned model is combined with supervised classification, thus constructing an adaptive detection model. The proposed framework has been verified using real ransomware data with a dynamic analysis testbed. Our extensive experimental results and discussion demonstrate that the proposed adaptive framework can successfully identify different variants of ransomware and achieve higher performance than existing supervised approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ransomware recently has been at the top of the list of most dangerous cyber threats [1] , [2] which has attracted enormous attention from the general public and business organizations [1] - [4] . In recent years [1] - [5] , mass ransomware attacks not only targeted to the individuals but also have been proliferated into the large business organizations such as courier companies [1] - [5] FedEx and TNT, Maerx, WPP The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo .
(the world's largest advertising agency), pharmaceutical company Reckitt Benckiser and Kingdom's National Health Service [2] - [5] . These attacks caused severe financial losses, e.g. an estimated damage by the WannaCry alone was 5 billion dollars approximately. The leading courier company of the world, FedEx, acquired $300 million financial loss resulting from disrupted operations, legal and reputational cost caused by ransomware attacks [1] - [4] . The world leader of shipping and logistic business, Maresk lost $200 million to $300 million due to catastrophic ransomware attacks which caused it to shut down its 76 terminal ports [2] - [6] .
Like many other malware [6] , ransomware are distributed via a vehicle of large infection vector such as social engineering, email attachment (CryptoLocker) [2] , [6] , selfpropagation, vulnerabilities of applications such as browser vulnerabilities (TeslaCrypt), Vendor plug-in such as java run time environment (JRE) vulnerability (DMA locker), vulnerabilities in the network protocols (NotPetya and WannaCry [6] , [12] ), download and extractions of malicious ZIP files causes to install dropper which later installs ransomware, malicious payload (CryptoWall ), usage of exploit kits spread ransomware such as angler browser exploit, neutrino exploit kit, EternalBlue exploit, and EternalRomance, any compromised search engine which produces malicious links of search results directs users to the malicious sites [2] - [7] .
Once ransomware reaches to the victim's machine through the aforementioned infection vehicle, it starts the reconnaissance phase [2] - [6] in which it searches for OS version, installed applications, user's files and folders, accessibility functions, backup files and folders, credential information in the victim's machine, and thereby identifies the most important resources and files [6] - [8] . Then in the execution and encryption phase, it contacts command and control server (C & C), copy the most important resources of user and files to another place as per instruction of C & C, removes the user's back-up folders to stop any restoration from backup, obtains required encryption keys from C & C, encrypts the targeted resources/files of the victim and rename those, delete original files and resources [2] , [3] . At the last stage, ransomware display a message to the victim to pay a ransom with a payment instruction to get the original files back in a decrypted form, so the victim gets back his system in an original working condition [3] . Initially, ransomware attacks were conducted by some opportunistic or script kiddies to gain a small amount of money or a few hundred dollars from individuals, most of which are personal computer level [2] , [5] , [7] . Later cybercriminals find this as a lucrative business idea, target larger business organizations and caused them to pay very large ransom demand [2]- [7] .
Explosive growth of ransomware happened due to enormous availability of easy cryptographic tools [2] - [4] for applying encryption techniques such as single key (symmetric key mechanism), dual key (public-private key) or hybrid to produce ransomware, easily available financial transaction methods with anonymity such as P2P cryptocurrencies [1]- [3] which influence ransomware authors to feel safe (not being caught by law enforcement agencies), availability of off-the-self ransomware development kit such as eda2, angler exploit kit, Neutrino exploit kit, Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) [3] - [6] based on the cloud platform which enable novice to create ransomware and spread. Increased usage of cloud-based file sharing such as OneDrive, google drive has also accelerated ransomware distribution for large business organizations [7] , [8] . Often ransomware authors not only demand the ransom, the installed ransomware create mass disruption in the system, for example, WannaCry locked out the health professionals from the electronic medical recording system (EMRS), computerized tomography (CT), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners, blood test service systems of UK's national health services [8] .
Due to the significant economic loss and severity of disruption in sensitive business organizations [2] , [7] , [12] , the detection of ransomware has been an important research problem. Many researchers in the literature, have proposed different detection approaches. These are broadly classified into three main categories: Static analysis approach, monitoring the activities on resources and files, and dynamic analysis approach.
Static analysis approach analyzes [9] , [10] the structure of ransomware from the source code and binary string, identifies execution paths and constructing the control flow graph (CFG), application program interface (API) calls and opcode sequences to extract significant feature space that can represent the ransomware families. In [9] , [10] , Bin Zhang, Wentao Xiao et.al used static analysis technique based on opcode sequence, N-gram opcode sequence and deep learning to detect ransomware. Static analysis [9] , [10] has limitations that it requires an expensive manual process to build signatures of malware for supervised detection engine. In addition to this, malware authors always generate new variants by using packing and code obfuscation techniques which makes it very difficult to prepare the signatures of new variants manually as soon as they are released and thereby leaving a gap for the high possibility of new infections.
Monitoring file in the users' machine [11] - [13] has been used in the literature to detect ransomware [11] . In [11] , the authors used an entropy-based technique to compare the status of original files in the backup and an infected file in its current state, thus stopping the synchronization if file is infected. This is an approach which can be considered as a countermeasure, however it has limitation towards the zero-day detection. Dynamic analysis allows [14] , [15] ransomware to open up itself to start execution and infection in a controlled environment. Therefore, there is no need to worry about obfuscated and encrypted payload, thus it can avoid the limitation of static analysis and can extract runtime feature of malware [15] , [16] . However, significant growth of ransomware through a very large infection vector, changes the patterns of infection very rapidly [3] , [11] , [16] . This requires a sophisticated detection engine which is based on the runtime feature of ransomware and requires as less supervised knowledge as possible. This directs us to develop a robust ransomware detection engine which will be adaptive to the rapidly changing infection patterns and to encrypted and obfuscated payloads.
This paper proposes a ransomware analysis and identification framework based on the runtime behavior of ransomware and deep learning based semi-supervised technique. Deep learning is a robust unsupervised approach which can extract the hidden intrinsic patterns from unsupervised feature space through a non-linear transformation and layered structure in which upper layers compute more abstract forms of features presenting the latent sources of variabilities in the feature space. The novelty of our proposed approach is that deep learning based semi-supervised technique can extract dynamics of behavioral patterns from the new variants of ransomware obtained from the wild and can integrate the latent sources to the supervised classifier, making the detection engine independent of manual signature generation and robust to the changes.
The contributions of this paper are listed below: 1) To develop an anti-obfuscation model of feature extraction using dynamic analysis.
2) To develop an adaptive detection engine using deep learning based semi-supervised model.
The new contributions of our proposed model are that the model can extract the attack patterns of the ransomware through the deep learning-based semi-supervised method, ransomware from 14 families with a large number of features have been considered and a novel feature extraction procedure has been developed. Moreover, our model is highly scalable and adaptive. Since the model can learn the frequently changing behavior of the ransomware and apply this knowledge to detect them, it ensures the zero-day detection.
The rest of the sections of this paper is as described in this paragraph. The next section presents the state of art ransomware detection techniques available in the literature. Section three describes our proposed semi-supervised framework. An extensive experimental analysis based on a real ransomware dataset to validate the efficiency of our proposed framework is presented in section four. Section five presents the conclusion of this research and future work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many different approaches have been proposed in the literature for the detection of ransomware. Authors of [35] , [36] have analyzed and discussed static, dynamic, hybrid and machine learning-based methods, pros, and cons of using them and the limitations of current research works. Bin Zhang et.al [9] proposes a convolution neural network (CNN) based approaches to detect ransomware using static analysis. Hanqi Zhang et.al [10] proposes N-gram model using opcode sequence to detect ransomware using a static analysis approach to map ransomware into families. The author extracted opcode from ransomware samples created N-grams sequences and calculated for each N-grams using term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) to select the valuable features between ransomware families. Then, they employed five machine-learning algorithms that have achieved high accuracy. Similarly, Poudyal et al. [28] performed multi-level static analysis by extracting the assembly and dll level of ransomware binaries. The cosine similarity is used to measure the similarity between these binaries. Several supervised machine learning classifiers are used to classify ransomware and benign samples. The experimental results showed high accuracy when both extracted features are combined. However, the static analysis can easily be evaded by the new ransomware variants through sophisticated packing techniques. Furthermore, it is not efficient for early ransomware detection since there is no need to execute the malicious samples during the static method, while some variants exhibit their malicious activities on the runtime [29] .
Regarding the dynamic analysis approach, many studies have been conducted for the detection of ransomware.
Hampton et al. [30] explained the salient features of the ransomware using windows API call features on 14 various ransomware strains. The frequency of the system calls for the ransomware, and baseline applications analyzed to evaluate the similarity between them. The experimental evaluation of this work claims that the ransomware activities can be identified through a unique low-level system calls that are present in the ransomware. Lorenzo Fernández et al. [16] , Suhyeon Lee [13] , and Seong Il Bae et al. [27] use dynamic analysis and supervised machine learning technique. The proposed approaches mostly focused on static, dynamic, or file monitoring approaches and face challenges to detect new variants of ransomware due to their supervised nature in detection engine. Therefore, it is essential to investigate how unlabeled new variants of ransomware can be used to build a model for zero-day protection.
Some researchers employed a data access control approach for the detection of ransomware. A recent work of Kyungroul Lee et al. [11] presented a detection approach based on monitoring file backup which compares the entropy of file in the backup copy and its current copy. Thus, identifying the difference in entropy. This approach is suitable and better than static analysis, however, it is a countermeasure approach of data security, and has limitations to safeguard before infection. Similar work was presented by Ben22 [31] to monitor the integrity of the files. When critical system files are modified, it gives an alarm to the administrator. These monitors are based on witness files and simple hash comparisons, and the LanmanServer operation is denied if the witness files are altered. However, this approach cannot guarantee the changed witness files are modified by a malicious program or a normal user. Lee et al. [13] proposed an approach to protect the user's important data using moving target defense (MTD). Authors analyzed WannaCry, Cerber, Locky and Tesla ransomware samples to determine the extensions that they are targeting. They changed the extensions of the valuable files on the user's machine that are frequently encrypted by the ransomware such as docx, .hwp, .pdf, .pptx, and .txt. This approach successfully protects the valuable user's files; however, users confuse the format of the files and need to remember the extensions that match their program.
Machine-learning methods for the detection of cryptoransomware were introduced by Sgandurra et al. [32] . Authors proposed EldeRan, a framework to observe some unique actions performed by ransomware to analyze features that support ransomware detection dynamically. They selected the informative binary features using Mutual information criteria and then feed to a machine-learning algorithm like Regularized Logistic Regression classifier. They also assigned a threshold of 30 seconds for the sample to execute. However, setting a fixed time is not applicable to all ransomware samples, since some variants exhibit their malicious activities after human interaction or discovering the executing environment. Machine learning-based methods have also been applied by the researchers in [34] . They have applied TF-IDF, Fisher's LDA and ET as machine learning method to detect ransomware. Behavioral early detection framework is proposed in Bander et al. [33] to detect zero-day crypto-ransomware using machine learning techniques with data-centric and semantic features. The detection module of the framework contains behavioral and anomaly detection scheme to improve the accuracy of the detection in the early stage before the encryption is carried out. However, the proposed framework was not implemented empirically. Later work, they proposed [14] a semi-random subspace model for zero-day protection using a bagging approach, however, this approach inherits limitations of scalability from the bagging method. This paper focuses on this key challenge to avoid future digital extortion. 
III. PROPOSED DETECTION METHODOLOGY
We proposed a detection framework to detect the ransomware using deep learning-based [17] , [24] , [26] approach. Deep Learning approach has the benefit of training the model using the extracted and selected features and behavioral patterns through hidden nodes in different layers. Since the cyberattack patterns have been changed very frequently, the inherent cyber-attack patterns can be extracted using the multiple layers of abstraction of Deep Learning [17] , [24] , [26] and represent he actual attack patterns to a non-linear and higher abstraction of the real scenarios which benefits the detection model. This key advantage of deep learning facilitates our model to achieve a higher accuracy rate.
A. PROPOSED DETECTION MODEL
Data Collection is the very first task of our detection model. The data set contains ransomware and benign ware. Preprocessing and feature extraction is done in the second phase. We have generated the global feature set which contains a large number of features, total 15972. FastICA [19] has been considered to compress the features. After the feature selection, we generate the feature vector. The classifier is trained using the train data set. We have considered 10-fold cross-validation to train and test the model. The performance of our detection model is evaluated using the test data set.
The deep learning-based model consists of the input layer, hidden layer, and output layer. Raw data has been provided to the input layer. One or multiple hidden layers can represent and transform this input data into a different level of abstraction. The upper layer will generate a higher level of abstraction of the data getting from the lower level. The transformation is occurred in each layer depending on the output of the lower layer. Eventually, the hidden layers transform the input data into a different level of abstraction obeying a non-linear transformation. The model can generate output utilizing the knowledge from the hidden layers. Since our objective is to detect the ransomware, we introduced a deep learning-based model where the hidden layers will revile the intrinsic attacking patterns of the ransomware and help to detect them. Deep learning can enhance the performance level of the detection system, as the model itself finds the behavioral patterns. Additionally, it can represent the attacking patterns into a non-linear and higher level of abstraction which helps to detect any malicious activity.
Since deep learning-based model handles multiple hidden layers, we need to decide how many hidden layers will be suitable for our model. Too many hidden layers will cost us more computational complexity, we have chosen two hidden layers. The nodes of the hidden layer can vary and form different architectures of nodes. As we have considered only two layers-we have named it as L1(first layer) and L2(second layer). Three different architectures have implemented in our model-Architecture1, Architecture2 and Architecture3. Architecture1 has equal number of nodes in L1 and L2. Architecture2 has a smaller number of nodes in L1 and more nodes in L2, whereas Architecture3 has more nodes in L1 and less nodes in L2. The following figures show the adapted architectures of our model.
In Figure 5 , the input layer is denoted as ''i'', hidden layer as ''j'', x is the bias of input nodes, y is the bias of hidden nodes and w is the weight then the structure of input (k) and hidden nodes (l) holds the energy [21] as follows
The nodes will generate O or 1 using the following equations
In these equations, σ (t) = 1/ 1 + e −t where t = x i + j w ij l j and t = y i + i w ij k i respectively. Equation 4 is followed in tanning section to maintain the stochastic ascent algorithm.
Let, the learning rate is µ. µ should be more than zero. The change of weight matrix is accumulated by the following equation where the expectation of data is denoted by β and the expectation of reconstruction is denoted by γ .
B. DATA COLLECTION, PRE-PROCESSING, AND ANALYSIS
The experimental dataset contains benign and ransomware samples. A total of 1308 benign applications are downloaded from Software-informer, the most trustworthy sourcesprovider of benign files. We also collected some benign samples from the system files located in the ''System32'' directory of a fresh installed Windows 7 Professional. Additionally, we have collected the 1232 ransomware samples of 14 different families from several publicly-available repositories such as VirusShare, VirusTotal. We also crawled other online forums that share ransomware like Malwarebytes and offensive-computing. Table 1 (A, B) presents the collected dataset description.
Once the data collection process is completed, the samples are passed to pre-processing tasks such as removal of duplicate files, file type identification, and labeling. Some ransomware contains duplicate samples that have the same MD5 hash value but different names. This redundancy can result in a poor characterization of the ransomware behavior, which leads to the increase of the false-positive alarms. To verify and remove such redundancy samples, we doublechecked the MD5 hash values from Virus Total service that has 57 common different antivirus engines. For detection purposes, it is necessary to identify the exact class label of the samples. Therefore, we employed the Antivirus ranking scheme based on the popularity of ransomware classes among Antivirus engines. To set ransomware labels, we used python script with a threshold value of 85 that accumulated the labels from the pool of AV in the VirusTotal repository. We consider ransomware to be a specific family if 85% of AV engines agreed on.
We have executed both ransomware and benign samples in an isolated environment. To perform dynamic analysis, every sample up to a range of 4 until 9 minutes were analyzed to show to their malicious behavior and to capture the execution traces of the samples using a cuckoo sandbox, while the ransomware sample is running on the host. Although the total original dataset was 2540, after removing samples that did not execute correctly, or sandbox terminated the analysis because of the maximum timeout that we set samples to run, or those that many AV assigned different family names, 483 ransomware from 14 distinct families and 754 benign samples were analyzed. Once the analysis is completed, the sandbox generated a human-readable JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) file for each analyzed sample. Then the features are extracted from the JSON file by parsing. Figure 6 represents the feature extraction process. Algorithm 1 illustrates the feature extraction process from the output files. Table 2 describes few of the extracted API calls along with the category. The attack stages are also mentioned here.
C. GLOBAL FEATURE SET GENERATION AND FEATURE SELECTION USING FastICA
The extracted features are then applied to the Algorithm 2 to generate the global set of features and the generation of if json_data_process is equal to states then 4.
set first_seen_temp = process_first_seen 5.
if first_seen is greater than first_seen_temp or equal to zero 6.
set first_seen = first_seen_temp 7.
for If name ends with ('json')then 17.
F name = initialize files that matches (name) 18.
Open the json data(J R + F name )as (json f ) 19 .
Set S data = load (json f ) 20.
Call the function of ObtainFeature (S data , true) 21.
Print(P R )} 22.
In the main function { 23.
Input J R ← parse_directory// initialize the director to be parsed 24.
Input P R ← F // set the place where the result will be stored 25.
Store the user's input in the (J R , PR)variables 26.
Json_Files
if name is equal to main then 28.
exit the system the feature vector. The global set of features is generated by combining all the features of the data set. In our data set, we have accumulated a total 15972 features in the global set. In the feature vector, the columns represent the features and the rows represent the ransomware or benign ware. The values of this vector will be {0,1} where {0} represents the absence of the feature and {1} represents the presence of the feature. Since the global set contains 15972 features and the data set contains 1237 samples, the two-dimensional matrix will contain 1237 rows and 15972 columns. The challenging task is to handle such a large number of features. Since ICA (Independent Component Analysis), a statistical procedure to solve the Blind Source Separation can be used in the selection process where the components are statistically independent [19] . FastICA [19] is considered as the feature compression method in our model. The high computation complexity of FastICA did not affect our system as we have used the GPU based operation [22] , [23] where we have used 8 parallel GPUs. We have selected 40,50, 80 and 100 features using FastICA [19] . These selected features are then applied to the model.
D. VARYING ARCHITECTURE OF NODES IN HIDDEN LAYERS AND EPOCH NUMBER
The performance of deep learning mostly depends on the size of mini batch, initial settings of weight, number of epochs, learning rate, momentum and number of hidden layers and units [10] . The different architectures of nodes in hidden layers also affect the performance of the deep learning-based model [11] . In the first phase of our experiment, we have varied the epoch number. We have varied the epoch number from 50 to 500. In the result section, we have mentioned only the performance result using 500 epochs because the 500 epochs show the best performance. Then, we have developed the three different node arrangements-Architecture1, Architecture2 and Architecture3. The following table (Table 3) shows the nodal arrangements that are considered in our model.
E. FINAL ALGORITHM
This section will represent the algorithm of our detection model. Here, we have considered the different arrangements Global Feature Set ← feature 8. end for 9. Feature vector ← ∅ 10. for each sample in input data set do 11.
Row ← ∅ 12.
Row is_Ransomware ← {0 for benign, 1 for Ransomware} 13.
If Feature is present in the sample 14.
Row Table 3 . We have varied the epoch number and do the train and test using 10-fold cross validation. The detection model is trained and tested using both global features and selected features obtained from Algorithm 2.
F. PERFORMANCE MATRICES
To evaluate the detection model, we have set the True Positive rate (TPR), False Positive rate (FPR), Accuracy, Recall, Precision, F1_score and AUC_ROC curve as the performance metrics. Sigmoid Cross Entropy Loss function [21] is adapted to represent the loss of the learning process. Moreover, performance graph is generated to represent the learning process of our model. In the performance graph, we have plotted the Accuracy and Loss after every epoch. As Accuracy and loss can be visualized from performance graphs, performance graphs are also considered to show the performance of our model. Suppose, TP(True positive) defines the number of benign applications which are accurately identified, TN(True negative) defines the number of ransomware which are accurately identified, FN(false negative) defines the number of ransomware that are classified as benign ware VOLUME 8, 2020 for fold = 1 to 10 do 7.
for epoch = 1 to 500 do 8.
Train the model using global set of features 9.
Test the model 10.
Evaluate Accuracy 1 11. end for 12.
end for 13. end for 14. Set selected features ← features selected by FastICA 15. for each arrangement in arrangements do 16. for fold = 1 to 10 do 17.
for epoch = 1 to 500 do 18.
Train the model using selectedfeatures 19.
Test the model 20.
Evaluate the Accuracy 2 21. 
Sigmoid Cross Entropy Loss
To compare the performance of our model, we have varied the epoch numbers and the nodal arrangements with different numbers of nodes in each layer. Moreover, we have conducted experiments using a global set of features and features selected by FastICA. Additionally, we have varied the number of selected features (40,50,80 and 100). We have conducted our experiments in the same simulation environment. Using the Confusion matrix, accuracy, recall, precision, F1_score, TPR, TNR, FNR and FPR are calculated. Performance graphs are generated after every experiment to show the achieved accuracy level and loss. We have compared our model to other machine learning-based methods. Accuracy and AUC(Area under ROC curve) are set as comparison metrics.
IV. RESULT ANALYSIS
In this section, we will represent the performance of our designed model. Since we are considering different number of nodes in the hidden layer, we have chosen three different architectures of node arrangements-equal number of nodes in hidden layers, more nodes in 1 st layer and less nodes in 2 nd layer and less nodes in the first layer, more nodes in 2 nd layer. In the first stage of our experiment, the deep learningbased detection model is developed using TensorFlow [17] , [24] , [26] , and the performance of this model is evaluated using the global set of features. Total 15,972 features are extracted using Algorithm 1 and the extraction procedure is shown in Figure 6 . This large number of features takes much more time even though we have GPU based A, B) is the performance analysis using the global set of features. Then we selected features using FastICA. We have evaluated the performance of our model using 40,50,80 and 100 selected features. Table 5 (A, B) represents the performance of the model using 40 features. Here we have achieved the highest 94.185% accuracy and 0.9860 AUC score with the architecture 2 (64 nodes in layer 1 and 128 nodes in layer 2). Then we evaluated our model using 50 features and the result is represented in Table 6 (A, B) . Here we have achieved the highest 94.837 % accuracy and 0.9871 AUC score with the architecture 1(512 nodes in each layer). This achieved accuracy is the highest one among the combinations with selected features. Table 8 (A, B) represents the performance of the model using 80 features. Highest achieved accuracy level is 94.347 with Architecture 1(32 nodes in each layer). Here, Highest AUC is 0.9883 with Architecture 1 (1024 nodes in each layer). This is the highest AUC score using selected features. Table 8 (A, B) shows the performance of our model using 100 selected features where the highest accuracy level is 94.434% and the highest AUC score is 0.9866 considering Architecture 1(1024 nodes in each layer).
To compare the performance details with other classifiers we have chosen SVM [20] , [23] , Random Forest [20] and Multiclass Classifier [10] . The performance details are represented in the Table 9 . We have compared our deep learning-based model with these classifiers. The comparison is illustrated in the following table 10.
From the comparison table (Table 10) , we have observed that our designed model using deep learning and FastICA [19] shows better performance than the other classifiers. Our detection model has achieved 95.96% and 94.837% of accuracy using global and FastICA [19] selected features respectively whereas the SVM achieved 89.97% and random Forest achieved 90.94% of accuracy. Moreover, the area under the ROC curve (AUC) is also used here to compare the performance level. Using the selected features, we have achieved 0.9883 AUC score with Architecture 1 (1024 nodes in each layer). Among all the architectural combinations, our detection model has achieved the highest 0.9935 AUC score using a global feature set with architecture 1 (1024 nodes in each layer) which is very close to 1. SVM, Random forest and Multiclass classifiers achieved 0.90,0.971 and 0.955 respectively. Table 4 , 5, 6, 7 and 8 have shown that the equal number of nodes in L1 and L2 (Architecture 1) shows the best accuracy and lower false positive rate. Additionally, higher epoch number shows better performance than lower epoch number.
Moreover, we have considered the accuracy Vs epoch and Loss vs epoch curves to represent the learning process of our model. We have also considered the Adam optimizer [21] , [22] to optimize the learning process. The following figures (Figure 7 and 8) shows the learning process of our model where the loss minimizes, and accuracy maximizes with the increase of epoch numbers.
As compared to other detection models, the superiority of our model is to extract the intrinsic attack patterns of the ransomware by incorporating the dynamic features into the deep learning-based method. Since we have developed a novel feature extraction mechanism to get the dynamic features considering 14families of ransomware, the dimensionality of the features is immense. The proposed deep learning-based model can handle this immense features and transform these features into a non-linear higher level of abstraction and apply this knowledge to identify the ransomware. This model is scalable as it can handle a large number of features as well as a large number of instances. Moreover, this adaptive model learns the dynamic natures of the samples and ensure zero-day detection. Parallel processing has been introduced to reduce the computational time and this makes our model efficient.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Easily available ransomware toolkits, ransomware as a service (RaaS) and a large vehicle of infection vector have created explosive growth of ransomware and severe digital extortion. Unlike traditional windows malware, ransomware executes additional operations including removing backup, encrypt original files, searching for important files in the victim's computer which causes a very high dimensionality in the execution logs and dynamic nature in the exploitation and execution patterns. This, in turn, causes supervised detection engine to fail to provide zero-day protection from future digital extortion. In this paper, we propose an adaptive framework which can extract the inherent nature of exploitation and encryption of new variants of ransomware. The extracted features are integrated into the supervised detection engine to build an adaptive model. Proposed methods have been tested in a real ransomware dynamic analysis engine with real ransomware data. Our experimental results demonstrate that proposed model achieves significant performance improvement over supervised detection approaches and achieves more than 95% accuracy. In future, we would work on a hybrid feature selection and adaptive model.
